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Mr Chairman,
Sir, I would first like to thank the Honourable Members for their
comments and questions, and for their support and robust commitment
to defence.
Trends in our Security Environment
Mr Ravindran, Mr Hawazi Daipi and Mr Steve Chia have asked for an
assessment of our regional security environment. Sir, the
geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific region is in a state of
flux. The shifts which are now taking place will lead to significant
changes in the geostrategic balance. The US remains pre-eminent,
with its superior military power, economic strength and political
influence. But alongside this is a new reality - China and India,
the two Asian giants, are now on the rise. This is reshaping the
strategic contours of our region. What is less clear is what shape
our region - and indeed the world - will take in the future. The
situation will be made more complex by the greater assertiveness of
Japan, and perhaps also a resurgent Russia, in the coming years.
China and India have both abandoned autarky and are seeking economic
linkages with the world. They are now both major trading and energy
importing nations, and their search for foreign sources of raw
materials and markets, as well as their dependence on them, can only
grow. As a consequence, both China and India now have an interest in
the security of sea routes, and of their energy sources.
Southeast Asia is situated at the confluence of major sea routes,
and at the crossroads between India and China. The Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are now vital lifelines for these two emerging
powers, as they are for the US, Japan and the countries in our
region. Our region is also a major source of oil and gas. So we can
expect that the issues of maritime security and energy security will
loom larger in our region and become more critical for the major
powers. Singapore, therefore, must have the wherewithal - military
and diplomatic - to play a role to contribute to regional security
and stability and also to protect our national interests and ensure
our security as the geopolitical landscape evolves.
Singapore and the SAF have therefore been playing active roles in
multilateral efforts to enhance maritime security. Over the past
year, we contributed to developing a consensus among the three
littoral states of the Straits of Malacca that while we, the
littoral states, have the primary responsibility for the security of
the Straits, major user states and other stakeholders have a role to
play as well. Also, whatever measures are undertaken to enhance
security must be in accordance with international law and respect
the sovereignty of the littoral states. Dr Ong asked about the
measures to safeguard the Malacca Straits. In the last two years,
the littoral states have jointly launched air and sea patrols to
demonstrate our commitment to safeguard this strategic waterway. We
are also working with the international community, through, for
example, the IMO and member states to focus on maritime security in
straits such as the Malacca Straits.
Another major threat to our security is - as Mr Hawazi has noted -
that of trans-national terrorism. The list of countries hit by
terrorist attacks continues to grow. The danger is by no means over.
In fact, with the terrorists exploiting modern technology to their
advantage and organising themselves better to evade detection, the
fight will be long and arduous one. This is a fight that may take
many generations, for it is an ideological war that they are waging.
The fact that Azahari Hussain was killed in Indonesia does not
change that. Personalities might change, organisations might evolve
but the ideology and the objectives remain the same and there are
others who are still at large. Bomb makers like Noordin Top and
their disciples, those who have learnt from them, these dark arts,
they are still at large. So we still have to remain on our guard.
Our
Defence Policy - Deterrence and Defence Diplomacy
Sir, Dr Ong Chit Chung has asked if new security threats have
brought any changes to our
defence policy. And Mr Ravindran asked about the state of our
defence relations and defence diplomacy. Sir, the fundamentals of
Singapore's defence policy are determined by our geography and
environment. We are a small island with no strategic depth. We have
no hinterland to absorb an attack, and there is no natural buffer
between the external environment and our populated areas and
economic infrastructure. We are also a maritime nation, critically
dependent on the security of sea lines of communications and the
freedom of navigation. Our geography - both in the contours and size
of our island and in our location in a sometimes turbulent region -
is immutable.
Given these realities and the uncertainties of the regional
environment, we continue to pursue deterrence and diplomacy as the
twin pillars of our defence policy. We have invested considerable
resources into building up a defence force that can deter
aggression. And should deterrence fail, the Singapore Armed Forces
must be able to defeat the aggressor swiftly and decisively.
At the same time, we have also been enhancing our security by
pursuing active defence diplomacy. The objectives of our defence
diplomacy are to develop positive and mutually beneficial
relationships with friendly countries and armed forces, to
contribute to a stable and cooperative regional environment and
international order.
On the bilateral level, good defence relations also enable us to
overcome our land and air space constraints. Today, the SAF trains
in about a dozen countries around the world. We are very grateful to
our friends for extending this assistance to us. These overseas
training facilities, along with the exercises that the SAF conducts
with foreign armed forces, bring significant benefits in terms of
enhancing the SAF's professional skills, improving inter-operability
with friendly forces, and offering opportunities to benchmark
ourselves. Our defence diplomacy also affords us valuable technology
cooperation.
The Strategic Framework Agreement we signed with the United States
last year provides the framework for Singapore and the US to expand
the scope of defence cooperation and work together to enhance
regional stability and peace.
We are also nurturing newer defence relationships. Having signed the
Defence Cooperation Agreement with India in 2003, we have since been
expanding interactions with the Indian Armed Forces. The regular
naval exercises over the past decade have now been augmented by air
and land exercises for the last two years. With China, my visit last
November at the invitation of my Chinese counterpart provided a
useful opportunity for developing a better understanding of each
other's perspectives on security issues of mutual concern, and it
was agreed that we would step up defence interactions.
Bilateral defence cooperation with our ASEAN partners, Thailand and
Brunei, continues to be substantive and strong, and from which both
sides benefit. We look forward to strengthening the mutually
beneficial defence cooperation with Indonesia when the Defence
Cooperation Agreement is concluded. This will stand as a strong
symbol of cooperation between two close neighbours.
Singapore also continues to play an active role in regional
groupings which enhance security, such as ASEAN, the Five Power
Defence Arrangements, the
ASEAN Regional Forum and, more recently, the East Asia Summit.
We support the creation of the ASEAN security community and we work
together with our ASEAN neighbours to realise it. As Asia opens up,
multilateral engagements will become even more important for
confidence-building and facilitating dialogue - not just among
regional parties but also to engage countries beyond the region
which have a stake in the stability and prosperity of Asia. Open
platforms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, will become
increasingly important now that greater cooperation is required to
deal with trans-national security issues like terrorism,
counter-proliferation and maritime security. The Shangri-la
Dialogue, held annually in Singapore since 2002 and to be held again
in the middle of the year, brings together defence ministers and
strategic thinkers from around the region and beyond to discuss the
global issues and create better understanding and hopefully better
consensus as to what can be done.
Singapore has also been an active participant in such multilateral
efforts as the Proliferation Security Initiative (or
PSI) and we work closely with other countries in the fight
against terrorism. The SAF organised the first PSI exercise in
Southeast Asia last August, which involved 13 participating
countries, sending ships, planes and observers. The RSN organised
the first sea exercise and other professional exchanges on maritime
security issues involving 19 navies of the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium. Last year also, the Army hosted a Special Forces
conference involving 19 Asia-Pacific countries to enhance regional
cooperation in counter-terrorism.
Sir, the SAF has also continued to participate in humanitarian
relief and peace support operations. We have deployed KC-135
tankers, C-130 transport aircraft and LSTs to support the
reconstruction of Iraq. Right now, one of our LSTs is currently in
the Northern Arabian Gulf. She is on patrol, I just read the report
before coming here, protecting the largest Iraqi oil terminal.
Closer to home, SAF monitors are working alongside their ASEAN and
EU counterparts in support of the Aceh peace process.
The SAF has also kept up a high operational tempo with various
relief missions. After assisting in
post-tsunami relief in Aceh and Phuket at the beginning of last
year, the SAF deployed again for
relief efforts in Nias in March, and when
Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in August. Last October, an
SAF medical team was sent to Bali after the terrorist attack, and
two C-130s delivered aid to Pakistan after the earthquake.
In all these missions, the SAF demonstrated its operational
readiness and professionalism. Their swift response and
effectiveness in executing these missions were the result of years
of steady investment in our people and equipment, and in building up
a robust system capable of rapid and flexible responses.
Defence Expenditure
Sir, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions are roles the
SAF undertakes to enhance Singapore's national interests and
contribute our part as a responsible international citizen. But the
SAF's core mission remains the defence of Singapore's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and our vital interests.
Both Professor Ivan Png and Mr Steve Chia have pointed out that the
defence budget takes up a significant proportion of national
expenditure. That is so because the Government considers it vital
that we have a defence capability which can effectively deter
potential adversaries. The Government's strong commitment to
ensuring Singapore's security, the calibre of our defence force, and
the determination of Singaporeans to protect what is theirs, is the
key to our security and survival as an independent country.
A strong defence allows us to pursue the best interests of our
country and our people, and to chart our own course steadily and
confidently. It is, unfortunately, the lot of small nations to come
under external pressure - as we have from time to time. We would not
want to have to succumb to such pressure. When there are loud voices
raised against us, we must be able to take them in our stride and
remain quietly confident. The SAF gives us the political space to
chart our own destiny.
Professor Png has asked why our percentage of GDP expenditure on
defence is higher than most other countries in Asia. As I had
pointed out last year in response to a similar question, numerical
comparisons of defence expenditures are not particularly meaningful.
For instance, to say that Vietnam spent almost 7% of GDP on defence
while Japan allocated 1% tells us, really very little, almost
nothing of the relative defence capabilities of these two countries.
And most importantly, no two countries have exactly the same
strategic circumstances. There is geography and history to consider,
the surrounding environment to look at. Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland believe that they should reap the peace dividend after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The situation in Europe today is
very different from when it was in the 70s or 80s. At the end of the
day, each country has to forge its own path, taking into account its
security environment and the unique combination of resources and
attributes that geography, demography and history have conferred on
it.
I should also point out that military expenditures in Asia have been
rising steadily. According to the US Congressional Research Service,
Asia is now the largest arms market in the developing world. From
2001 to 2004, five of the top ten buyers were from Asia, namely
China, India, South Korea, Malaysia and Pakistan. Since 2000, some
countries have doubled their military spending to modernise their
armed forces. Western European and Russian defence companies are
finding that the Asia-Pacific is a significant market, not just in
terms of quantity, purchasing power but also for increasingly
sophisticated hardware.
Professor Png has made the point that there is no need to spend more
money simply because the economy is growing. And indeed, MINDEF does
not take a feast and famine approach. We do not suddenly ramp up
spending just because we have a good year. Nor do we squeeze it down
sharply when the economy turns down. Our policy has been to put in
consistent investments, both in good times and lean years.
It would be too late to start buying weapons and to raise and train
forces only when an obvious threat confronts us. Building an
effective defence force takes many years and cannot be done in fits
and starts. It takes more than a decade to bring a major new
capability into service - from conception to bringing the system
into operation with fully trained servicemen and supporting
infrastructure. MINDEF draws up long-term multi-year plans so that
the SAF is built up as a coherent and integrated force. There are
checks and balances in the system to make sure that the money is
well spent.
Sir, the development of our defence capabilities cannot be directed
only at what appears to be the most imminent threat. We should not
lose sight of the fundamentals of our geostrategic circumstances
just because terrorism is the most obvious threat today. We must
remember that our most critical need is really to have a defence
force which can deter threats to our sovereignty, enable us to
withstand external pressure, and prevail over the aggressor should
there be a conflict.
I wish to assure Dr Ong, Mr Hawazi and Professor Png that at the
same time the SAF has also been strengthening its capabilities for
homeland security, and will continue to do so, working closely with
the Home Team to deal with terrorist threats. Among these
capabilities, let me just mention two. One is the
Island Defence Headquarters and the second, our
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives units. It is
important to know that these two, both the IDHQ, Island Defence HQ
and the CBRE units are not new creations. We did not create them
just after 9 - 11 2001. Both have been in existence or development
for some two decades. The possibility of low-intensity,
unconventional attack was one which we never dismiss and hence which
we prepared for.
So we made contingencies to deal with them. When the threat of
catastrophic terrorism reared its ugly head in 2001, we were able to
build on the existing Island Defence Headquarters, augment it with
certain capabilities and stand it up quickly as a 24/7 Headquarters.
We had started building up our Chemical Biological Radiological
Explosives capability in the late 1980s - almost 20 years ago. This
included seeking the expertise of some of Professor Png's colleagues
in NUS so that we painstakingly built up a complete capability with
operational units suited to operate in our climatic conditions,
backed up by laboratories and experts, and based on a solid
scientific foundation. This goes to show how important it is to take
a long-term view when it comes to developing our defence
capabilities; we cannot afford to wait until a threat is upon us. If
we have not built up the IDHQ and CBRE units over a long time span,
when Sept 11 2001 struck us, we would have been scrambling around,
trying to get things in place and I am not even sure that today,
just four or five years later, that we would be safe and satisfied
with what we have, with just that three or four years.
Sir, MINDEF is fully conscious of our responsibility to use the
money allocated to defence prudently and stringently. MINDEF has
rigorous checks in our budget process. Acquisition programmes are
carefully scrutinised at various levels to determine need, evaluate
options, and decide on the most cost-effective solutions.
The rigour and integrity of our system is widely acknowledged by
defence analysts. Singapore has acquired a hard-earned reputation as
a reference customer. This was why our decision on the
RSAF's Fighter Programme was watched so closely around the
world. Let me quote a recent observation in the 21 February 2006
issue of Flight Daily News, which says: "Singapore's
evaluation was widely praised as being thorough, in-depth and
comprehensive." In fact, a number of countries who are considering
fighter purchases have come to our procurement agencies to ask us
the processes by which we went through our evaluation. Another
article, in the 23 February issue of Aviation Week, noted
that for the contenders in the current competition to supply the
RSAF a trainer aircraft, "a win . . . will be valuable not only in
financial terms. Singapore's preference may well go on to influence
other prospective customers worldwide." We could not have gained
such a reputation if MINDEF did not have the highest standards of
prudence and stringency in our expenditure.
Sir, history has no lack of examples of nations which have fallen to
aggressors because they were not prepared. Or not prepared to be
prepared. We all know what happened to Kuwait in 1991. Singapore has
no buffer. If deterrence should fail and the SAF is called into
battle, it cannot afford to fail in its mission. We will not have a
second chance. This is what we mean when we say that our defence
spending is our insurance policy. We have to maintain a strong
defence now so that we will not have to pay a much higher price in
the future. At another level, as the Minister for Defence, as I am
sure, this is true for all Singaporeans, we should make sure that if
our soldiers, sailors and airmen ever have to go into battle, they
have the best equipment and training that we can provide them.
Transformation and the 3G SAF
Sir, Mr Ravindran, Mr Leong Horn Kee, Dr Teo, Mr Sin Boon Ann have
asked about the progress of the SAF's transformation efforts. I
would like to report that we are well on the way to developing the
capabilities of the
3rd Generation SAF. The SAF has been experimenting with new
operational concepts, capabilities, technologies and training
methods.
As I pointed out last year, transformation is a journey and not a
static goal. This ensures that the SAF is always ready to face new
challenges and can fight and win the wars of tomorrow, not get stuck
in the fighting concepts of past wars. As one set of capabilities is
delivered, there will be a spiral development to deliver the next
set of capabilities. These are the demands of the modern battlefield
as armed forces leverage on technology to enhance their edge over
potential adversaries. We are fortunate that MINDEF and the SAF have
the science and engineering resources in our Defence organisations
and industries; and that more than 80% of each cohort coming into
National Service are tech-savvy soldiers with A-level, Polytechnic,
or ITE qualifications. And our National Servicemen in our reserve
forces also are very well qualified and have no difficulty
converting to this new equipment and concepts.
Mr Leong Horn Kee and Mr Ravindran asked about the impact of the
reduction in full-time NS to 2 years, for those who previously
had to serve 2½ years. As Members are aware, the transformation of
the SAF was the key driver that made this feasible. The 2-year NS
system has been implemented smoothly since December 2004.
Incidentally, the drive to 3G SAF also allowed us to reduce the ICT
call-ups for our NSmen from 13 years to 10 years. So it is not just
the fulltime NSmen but also the NSmen who have benefited from this,
the operationally ready NSmen. The training of our commanders and
for our units has been adjusted to factor in the shorter deployment
period of our national servicemen. Our transformation efforts also
mean that more of our national servicemen will be deployed in
positions which are more challenging and make better use of their
education and training in utilising the capabilities of the 3G SAF.
Sir, I have sought the Chairman's indulgence and the Speaker's
indulgence, So allow me now to share with Members a
video which illustrates one of the key capabilities of the 3G
SAF. This shows the integrated sensor-shooter network which was
exercised in two major exercises the SAF conducted last November -
Forging Sabre in the Mojave Desert in California, and Wallaby in
Shoalwater Bay in Queensland. In these exercises, the SAF linked a
series of sensors - manned and unmanned, airborne and ground - to
form a tight network to watch over the battlefield. As you can see,
once a sensor detects a target, the information is sent to the HQ in
real time. A UAV can track the enemy and relay a continuous stream
of target information to the HQ and a network of shooters. The most
appropriate shooter is quickly assigned to take out the target. Or a
suite of shooters can launch a synchronised attack. Fighter aircraft
can come in quickly with precision bombs. The Apache attack
helicopters, which can detect more than 200 targets with their
Longbow radar, can take out many tanks rapidly with Hellfire
missiles, rockets and guns. The artillery guns will wipe out what
remains of the enemy. Multiple sensors can confirm the effects on
the enemy forces and the HQ can quickly decide what follow-on
strikes are necessary. With information technology and networking,
the SAF has brought the sensor-to-shooter cycle down to a matter of
minutes. I will show it to you again so that you can have another
look.
As you can see, we can find the target by multiple means and we can
attack it by multiple means as well. This makes it difficult for the
enemy to hide or to run. It also makes it difficult for him to
counter-attack effectively as there is no single point of
vulnerability that he can hit and cripple our systems. In
conventional warfare, the commanders are also faced with a dilemma,
a trade-off between dispersion and concentration of forces is a key
challenge. Networking allows us to disperse our forces so that we
are less vulnerable, and yet able to bring together a concentration
of fire, concentration of force and effects, to deliver a massive
blow to the enemy.
You can see that the strength of the 3G SAF is not from superior
platform numbers or specific platform capabilities alone. Rather,
the strength of the 3G SAF will be multiplied by the ability to
network our various systems and capabilities together to achieve a
quantum leap in total capability. For example, the way to combat
tanks is no longer by fielding more and bigger tanks. These are
necessary but this is not the only way to solve the problem. Our
anti-tank capability will comprise a network of unmanned sensors,
precision missiles delivered by Apache attack helicopters, smart
bombs delivered by fighter aircraft, and armoured forces on the
ground. The whole, as the saying goes, will be greater than the sum
of the parts. I have distributed a DVD and some MINDEF and SAF
publications showing
Exercise Forging Sabre and Exercise Wallaby to give Members a
clearer concept of networked warfare.
Mr Sin Boon Ann asked what the SAF has learned from the US
experience in Iraq. First, let me say that the SAF is constantly
learning from many other armed forces and not just the Americans. In
doing so, we do not merely copy, but apply what we learn to our own
circumstances. Technologies will not solve all the problems in the
urban environment, or for that matter any environment. But we will
equip our soldiers with technologies that can make a significant
difference to their fight in the urban environment.
I have here with me an example of such technologies. It is meant to
be dropped and thrown, so it is all right. This surveillance ball
was developed by ST Engineering for fighting in built-up areas (or
FIBUA). It has embedded sensors, and our soldiers can roll it round
a corner or throw it into a room so they can see behind walls. This
will improve situational awareness and minimise casualties. 3SIR,
our urban operations battalion, is now conducting trials with this
FIBUA surveillance ball. The SAF will be fielding more of such
technologies to help our soldiers overcome the many complexities of
the battlefield.
As the SAF continues its transformation journey, it will continue to
maintain a high state of operational readiness. The operational
readiness of the SAF may not make headlines everyday. But the SAF is
constantly at work quietly behind the scenes - whether conducting
regular naval and air patrols in the Malacca Straits, securing major
international events like the International Olympic Council meeting,
or escorting high value ships through our sealanes.
Training Safety
Sir, the operational readiness of the SAF requires sustained hard
work and rigorous training. The training has to be rigorous, as
pointed out by Mr Ravindran, and it has to be realistic. We have to
prepare our servicemen well, because military operations are very
demanding and victory or defeat hangs in the balance. We also owe it
to our servicemen that we prepare them adequately so that they have
the ability and confidence to fight, survive and win should they
ever have to go into battle.
Training has to be tough and realistic but it also has to be in
strict accordance with safety regulations and safety procedures.
There is top-level focus on safety in the SAF. Mr Tan Soo Koon has
point out. And we do expect the highest safety standards from our
commanders. Safety requirements are systematically integrated into
all SAF activities, and safety systems and processes are continually
being improved.
The SAF has also strengthened its safety inspectorates and, in
addition to safety officers, formations have been augmented with
Formation Safety Warrant Officers who have extensive experience and
knowledge of safety and risk management. There are regular safety
audits of the units, including surprise audits. The previous
workyear, the last workyear, there were about 1000 such audits so
that works out to about 20 such audits in various units. High-risk
activities are audited more frequently. The results of the audits
are reported to the respective Service Chiefs.
Whenever there is an incident, whether or not it involves injury,
the safety inspectorate of the particular Service will review what
happened and draw lessons, and these lessons are then disseminated
to all personnel. The SAF also reviews near-misses as valuable
lessons can be drawn from them. We want to develop an open culture
where people are encouraged to report near misses and share the
lessons. And this requires a change in mindset. We are working on
that. The SAF is also drawing lessons from the safety practices of
other established armed forces like the UK, US and Australia. Ms
Irene Ng asked about comparisons with other armed forces. Yes we do
benchmark. We compare the systems and the procedures that we have in
place against those in other armed forces and we are comparable, if
not better than the best practises. We are not able to compare data
because of the basis of collecting the data, numerators and
denominators are different and there is no standardised basis for
this. Except for the air force. The air forces use the number of
incidents or accidents, per 100 000 hours as the norm for which they
compare against each other. On that comparative basis, our air force
does as well as, if not better than the air forces of advanced
developed countries. So our safety systems are there and in place.
There are two dimensions to safety, both equally important - the
system and the individual. We must have rigorous safety systems and
processes and there must be strong command emphasis and command
responsibility. Our servicemen must also have a high level of safety
consciousness and alertness, so that the entire safety chain remains
strong and unbroken. We will do our best, but even with the best
efforts, it is not possible to entirely eliminate training
incidents. However we must ensure a rigorous system, minimise human
errors, and learn from the mistakes and not repeat them. And reduce
to absolute minimum and eliminate them if possible, such accidents.
Sir, Mr Tan Soo Khoon and Dr Ong Chit Chung asked about the training
deaths last year. There were 4 training incidents that resulted in
fatalities in 2005. In the first incident in June 2005, a regular
serviceman in training for the Special Operations Force drowned
during maritime counter-terrorist training. This is very demanding
training to carry out the extremely difficult mission of approaching
a ship which may be in the open sea, and then taking it over, by
force if necessary, with minimum casualties to any hostages. Only
specially selected regular troopers who volunteer for this Force
undergo such training. And they are rigorously prepared in step by
step, progressive training, in order to be able to conduct such
missions. It is a very very demanding mission. These are things
which ordinary human beings don't do. These are very special men and
I certainly am deeply grateful and the nation should be deeply
grateful that there are men, Singaporeans who are prepared to
volunteer for such missions and to put their lives on the line at
anytime, 24 hours a day when they are called upon to undertake a
rescue mission. The Attorney General's Chambers, after reviewing the
facts of the case, the investigation reports by the Police, and the
findings of the Coroner's Court, found no legal grounds for
proceeding with criminal charges against the four servicemen who
were conducting the training. AGC has now referred the matter to
MINDEF for possible action under military law. MINDEF will conduct
further investigations before we decide on the next course of
action. If our investigations show that any of the 4 servicemen has
failed to perform his duties as required, we will take the
appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the serviceman under
military law.
The second incident in July 2005 involved two servicemen - an SAF
serviceman and a foreign serviceman. They were doing helicopter
rappelling training when they fell after their ropes disengaged from
the rope attachment device on the helicopter. The Police
investigation is still in progress. This training has since resumed
after a thorough review has been done and improvements were made to
the rope attachment device and dispatch procedures.
The other two cases were of two servicemen who collapsed while
taking part in runs and subsequently died. The autopsies revealed
that these were cases of Sudden Cardiac Death. Our investigations
showed that the medical responses in both cases were appropriate and
adequate. The SAF has a regime for screening for cardiac risk
factors, starting before a serviceman is enlisted. But it is not
always possible to detect a heart ailment before a person suffers a
heart attack. Over the last five years, there were 6 cases of Sudden
Cardiac Death in the SAF that occurred during training.
Sir, the SAF will continue to strengthen its safety systems and
procedures, as well as its safety culture. Even as we proceed with
tough and realistic training - as we must, to enhance the SAF¨s
capabilities and operational readiness - MINDEF will continue to
make sure that we do so without compromising safety.
On Ms Irene Ng's suggestion to erect a memorial to commemorate
servicemen who lost their lives in the line of duty, MINDEF
recognises that the servicemen who lose their lives have made the
ultimate sacrifice while serving the country. We will consider her
suggestion. During the
SAF Day Parade on 1st July each year, a minute's silence is
observed to pay tribute to the servicemen who lost their lives in
the course of duty. This is a deeply significant segment of the
annual parade. MINDEF believes that this is a meaningful and solemn
recognition of SAF servicemen who lost their lives during training.
Sir, technology is critical for the 3G SAF. But the human spirit in
any fight is perhaps even more critical. Our soldiers must be
well-trained and disciplined, and they must have in them the
fighting spirit to overcome adversity and defeat the enemy
regardless of the conditions, regardless of the odds. I fully agree
with the observation that ultimately it is the people who make the
difference - people who are well trained and who have the
determination to fight and win.
Singaporeans should be grateful for the commitment and sacrifices of
our National Servicemen. They form the backbone of our defence. Our
nation is fortunate that Singaporeans understand the need for
National Service, and that our NSmen are committed to their duty to
the nation and their families give them their support as they do so.
It is only right that we show our appreciation for the efforts and
contributions of our NSmen.
I am therefore pleased to inform Members that after careful study of
RECORD IV's recommendations, MINDEF has accepted all the
recommendations. The recommendations are comprehensive, benefiting
all NSmen and recognising their contributions, with a good mix of
broad-based initiatives, such as the
40th Anniversary NS Bonus, and targeted initiatives, such as the
proposals to recognise our key command and staff appointment
holders. Dr Ng Eng Hen will be elaborating on the recommendations.
Sir, security is the very basis of our existence as an independent
nation, free to chart our own destiny. Without security, we will not
have a firm foundation for the prosperity and social harmony which
have made Singapore a good home, the best home for all Singaporeans.
Without a defence force capable of safeguarding our sovereignty and
our vital interests, we may well be nothing more than a state
subservient to some bigger country or - worse - cease to exist as a
nation. Singaporeans understand the need for a strong SAF and they
are committed - as National Servicemen and the family members who
support them - to playing their part in ensuring that the SAF
continues to anchor the peace and security we have enjoyed for the
last 40 years. Thank you, Sir.
Source:
www.mindef.gov.sg Media
Release 6 Mar 2006
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Defence Minister Teo speaks on training deaths in 2005
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